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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
EDGARDO MENDOZA, : Case No. 950337-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (Supp. 1995), whereby a criminal 
defendant may take an interlocutory appeal to the Court of 
Appeals from a final order for anything other than a conviction 
for a first degree or capital felony. The Order granting the 
petition for interlocutory review is contained in Addendum A. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of relevant statutes and constitutional 
provisions is contained in Addendum B: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(2) (a) (1995) 
Amendment V to the U.S. Constitution 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Do the imposition of a fine and punitive isolation by the 
Utah Department of Corrections at a disciplinary hearing 
constitute "punishment," thereby precluding the State under the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution from pursuing criminal prosecution and 
punishment against Appellant Edgardo Mendoza ("Mendoza" or 
"Appellant") for the same offense? 
STANDARD OR REVIEW: This issue involves a 
question of law which this Court reviews for 
correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 
1994); State v. Davis, 903 P.2d 940, 942 (Utah 
App. 1995) (cert, granted). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
On February 27, 1995, Mendoza filed a Motion to Dismiss 
the charge against him on the grounds that he is being subjected 
to multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. R. 21-30. A copy of that motion is 
contained in Addendum C. Following a hearing, the trial court 
denied Mendoza's motion on May 8, 1995. R. 61. 
Mendoza filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal 
Interlocutory Order with this Court on May 25, 1995. R. 76-87. 
A copy of that petition is contained in Addendum D. This Court 
granted Mendoza's petition for interlocutory review on June 22, 
1995. R. 74. See Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
In an Information dated August 15, 1994, the State 
charged Mendoza with one count of Assault on a Correctional 
Officer, a class A misdemeanor. R. 1-2. 
On February 27, 1995, Mendoza filed a Motion to Dismiss 
the charge against him on the grounds that he is being subjected 
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to multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution. R. 21-30. See Addendum C. 
Mendoza also filed a "Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss." A copy of that memorandum is contained in Addendum C. 
On March 6, 1995, the State filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Mendoza7s Motion to Dismiss. R. 31-44. On 
March 10, 1995, the State filed an Affidavit of Terry Bartlett, 
Director of Institutional Operations at the Utah Department of 
Corrections, and the Utah Department of Corrections filed a 
"Memorandum Re: Double Jeopardy." R. 45-47, 48-52. 
On March 13, 1995, the trial court held a hearing on 
Mendoza7s Motion to Dismiss. R. 102-151. On May 8, 1995, the 
trial court signed a written Order denying Mendoza7s motion 
(R. 61) and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
R. 58-60. A copy of the Order with Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law is contained in Addendum E. 
Mendoza filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal 
Interlocutory Order with this Court on May 25, 1995. R. 76-87. 
This Court issued its Order granting interlocutory review on 
June 22, 1995. R. 74. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 7, 1994, Mendoza allegedly assaulted a 
correctional officer at the Utah State Prison with bodily fluids. 
R. 1, 22, 48, 59, 85. The Department of Corrections held a 
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disciplinary hearing and, based on the conduct charged in the 
present case, thereafter sentenced Mendoza to pay a $200 fine and 
serve thirty days in punitive isolation. R. 22, 48, 59, 85. 
On August 15, 1994, after the disciplinary hearing, the 
State filed the Information in the present case, charging Mendoza 
with one count of Assault on a Correctional Officer, a class A 
misdemeanor, arising out of the same alleged assault of August 7, 
1994. R. 1-2, 59, 85. 
The trial judge denied Mendoza7s Motion to Dismiss and 
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. See Addendum E. 
The trial judge concluded that the fine and isolation imposed in 
this case were not "punitive" and that Mendoza's protection 
against double jeopardy was not violated. R. 60. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mendoza's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment protection 
against double jeopardy was violated in this case where he was 
punished for the same behavior in a prison disciplinary 
proceeding prior to the filing of criminal charges. The State 
agreed that the disciplinary proceeding was a "separate 
proceeding" under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The fine imposed 
on Mendoza was "punitive," thereby triggering double jeopardy 
protection. Under the Halper1 /Austin2 test, the fine was 
1
 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 
L.Ed.2d 487 (1989). 
2
 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. , 113 S.Ct. , 125 
L.Ed.2d 488 (1993). 
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imposed for retributive and deterrent reasons; since it was not 
solely remedial, it implicated double jeopardy protection. Under 
the more general Arbon3 totality of the circumstances test, the 
fine also was punitive. Because Mendoza was punished in a 
separate proceeding prior to the filing of criminal charges, the 
trial court erred in denying Mendoza's Motion to Dismiss. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE FINE IMPOSED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS AT A SEPARATE PROCEEDING WAS 
"PUNITIVE"; MENDOZA'S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT 
AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY IS VIOLATED BY THIS 
SUBSEQUENT CRIMINAL PROCEEDING BASED ON THE SAME 
CONDUCT. 
The double jeopardy clause protects against three forms 
of abuse: (1) "a second prosecution for the same offense after 
acquittal", (2) "a second prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction", and (3) "multiple punishments for the same offense." 
Halper, 490 U.S. at 440, 109 S.Ct. at 1897, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 at 
(citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 
2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969)); see also State v. Davis, 903 P.2d 
940, 943 (Utah App. 1995), cert, granted March, 1996; Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-1-6(2) (a) (1995). The third area of abuse--whether 
Mendoza was subjected to multiple punishments for the same 
offense--is at issue in this case. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 440; 
Davis, 903 P.2d at 943. 
As the Court emphasized in Halper, the protection against 
3
 State v. Arbon, 909 P.2d 1270 (Utah App. 1996), cert, 
denied, P.2d (1996). 
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multiple punishments for the same offense "has deep roots in our 
history and jurisprudence." Halper, 490 U.S. at 440. In Halper, 
the Court held that "under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant 
who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not 
be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that 
the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, 
but only as a deterrent or retribution." Halper, 490 U.S. at 
448-49. 
In Halper, after the defendant was convicted for filing 
false Medicare claims, the government brought a civil action 
which would have resulted in Halper paying $130,000 for 65 acts 
of filing false claims. Halper, 490 U.S. at 435. The Halper 
Court considered whether the sanction was remedial in nature and 
therefore did not trigger double jeopardy protection, or punitive 
in nature, thereby triggering the protection. As the Court 
pointed out, "punishment serves the twin aims of retribution and 
deterrence." Halper, 490 U.S. at 448. "'Retribution and 
deterrence are not legitimate nonpunitive governmental 
objectives.'" Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539, 
n.20, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)). The Court concluded 
that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said 
solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather 
can only be explained as also serving either 
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment 
as we have come to understand the term, 
[citation omitted.] We therefore hold under the 
Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already 
has been punished in a criminal prosecution may 
not be subjected to an additional civil sanction 
to the extent that the second sanction may not 
fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as 
a deterrent or retribution. 
6 
Id. at 448-49. 
Following Halper, the United States Supreme Court 
reiterated the Halper analysis in determining whether a sanction 
is punitive in the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines context. See 
Austin, 509 U.S. at 609, 113 S.Ct. at 2812, 125 L.Ed.2d at 505 
(citing Halper, 490 U.S. at 447-48). The Court concluded that 
forfeiture does not "serve [] a solely remedial purpose" and was 
therefore punitive in nature. Austin, 509 U.S. at 622, 113 S.Ct. 
at 2812. The Court again followed Halper and Department of 
Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, U.S. , 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 
767 (1994), and held that a tax was punitive in nature and 
therefore subject to double jeopardy claims. Kurth Ranch, 114 
S.Ct. at 1948. 
Although Halper dealt with a situation where the criminal 
sanction preceded the civil sanction, various courts have applied 
Halper in situations where a punitive civil sanction was applied 
prior to a criminal sanction. See e.g. United States v. Hudson, 
14 F.3d 536, 540 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Sanchez-
Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 199 (5th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 
U.S. , 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992); United States v. 
Mavers, 897 F.2d 1126, 1127 (11th Cir.), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 
865, 111 S.Ct. 178, 112 L.Ed.2d 142 (1990). 
In Davis, 903 P.2d at 946, this Court applied the 
Austin/Halper analysis as to whether a sanction is punitive and 
therefore triggers double jeopardy protection in the forfeiture 
context. This Court pointed out that the "solely remedial 
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purpose" language which was "underscored in Austin" clarifies 
that the Austin/Halper test applies in determining whether a 
sanction is punitive, and "even if a statute is remedial in part, 
if it has any punitive attributes, constitutional protections 
attach." Id. (citing Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2812). This Court 
held that the forfeiture statute at issue was not solely 
remedial, but was punitive in nature, and that double jeopardy 
protection therefore applied and barred a subsequent criminal 
proceeding. Davis, 903 P.2d at 948, 950; see also State v. a 
House and 1.3 Acres, 886 P.2d 534, 540-41 (Utah 1994) (forfeiture 
is punitive and therefore Excessive Fines Clause of Eighth 
Amendment applies). The focus in determining whether a sanction 
is punitive is "on whether 'the sanction as applied in the 
individual case serves the goals of punishment.'" Davis, 903 
P.2d at 949 (quoting Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2812 n.14). The 
question of whether the sanction is disproportionate to the 
government's costs in prosecution is irrelevant. Davis, 903 P.2d 
at 949-50. 
Following this Court's decision in Davis, the United 
States Supreme Court held in United States v. Ursery, 116 S.Ct. 
2135 (1996), that "in rem civil forfeitures are neither 
"punishment" nor criminal for purposes of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause." Id. at 214 9. The Court reasoned that an in rem 
forfeiture is distinguishable from an in personam fine and that 
historically, in rem proceedings have not constituted punishment. 
The Court distinguished Halper by emphasizing that Halper 
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involved a civil penalty rather than a civil forfeiture; Ursery 
focused on the historical distinction between civil forfeiture 
and civil penalties, rejecting the Halper rule only in the 
context of civil forfeitures. Because the instant case does not 
involve a civil forfeiture, the Ursery analysis does not apply. 
In State v. Arbon, 909 P.2d 1270 (Utah App. 1996), this 
Court held that a driver's license revocation is not "punitive" 
under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 1270. This Court 
determined that "in the context of an administrative license 
suspension," the Halper/Austin analysis is not strictly applied. 
Arbon, 909 P.2d at 1272. Instead, this Court "perform[ed] xa 
particularized assessment of the penalty imposed and the purposes 
that the penalty may fairly be said to serve.'" Id. at 272 
(quoting Davis, 903 P.2d at 947 (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 448, 
109 S.Ct. at 1901)). This Court "focus[ed] on xno single "key" 
factor,' . . . recognizing that 'the specific analysis that 
applies to determine whether a sanction constitutes punishment 
within the meaning of the double jeopardy clause varies depending 
upon the sanction.'" Arbon, 909 P.2d at 1272 (quoting Baldwin v. 
Department of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. App. 4th 1630, 42 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 422, 430 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Kurth Ranch, 114 
S.Ct. at 1946)) . 
In determining whether driver license revocation 
proceedings are punitive, the Arbon Court considered: 
(1) whether the purposes of "past uses of license suspensions" 
had been punitive or nonpunitive; and (2) "the overall purpose 
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and intent" of the statutory scheme. Arbon, 909 P.2d at 1273. 
It concluded that (1) historically license suspension has not 
been considered "punitive," and (2) the purpose of the statutory 
scheme is to promote public safety, not punish individuals. Id. 
at 1272-74. This Court held that license suspension is not 
punitive and does not therefore trigger double jeopardy 
protection. Id. at 1275. 
In this case, the State agreed that the fine imposed on 
Mendoza was done so in a separate proceeding prior to the filing 
of criminal charges. R. 122. Hence, the only issue presented to 
this Court is whether the fine was "punitive," thereby triggering 
double jeopardy protection. 
Pursuant to either the Austin/Halper test or the Arbon 
test, the fine imposed on Mendoza was "punitive." A fine is by 
definition punishment. Webster's Dictionary defines a fine as "a 
sum of money paid by way of penalty for an offense; a pecuniary 
punishment. To fine is to subject to a pecuniary penalty for an 
offense or breach of law; to punish by fine." Webster7 s 
Dictionary, 2nd Ed., p. 687; see generally People v. McVickers, 
840 P.2d 955, 957 (Cal. 1992) ("Commonly understood definitions 
of punishment are intuitive: there is little dispute that 
additional jail titne ox extxa. iines axe punis^er^.u) . 
The focus under the Halper/Austin test is whether the 
sanction is solely remedial, or whether it has a deterrent or 
retributive aspect. Mendoza does not have a job and any money he 
obtains comes from gifts from family and friends. R. 110. When 
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someone gives money to Mendoza by placing it on his books at the 
prison, the prison automatically takes sixty percent of the 
amount. R. 110. Thereafter, at the end of each month, the 
prison takes an additional sixty percent of the amount remaining 
on the books. R. 110-11. Under these circumstances, the $200 
fine is an extraordinary amount which precludes an individual 
from obtaining items from the commissary until paid. Fining 
inmates serves a punitive purpose. It has both a deterrent and 
retributive effect where prisoners have been subjected to prison 
discipline. It alters the original sentence being served by the 
individual. Accordingly, it is not solely remedial and is 
"punitive" under the Halper/Austin test. 
This fine is also "punitive" under the more general Arbon 
analysis. Under the totality of circumstances, the fine is 
excessive and punitive in nature. As previously outlined, $200 
is a tremendous amount of money in a prison context. Mendoza has 
no source of income. Such a fine severely restricts his access 
to commissary items. The fine has little to do with the orderly 
operation of the prison. 
Historically, although prisons have applied various 
disciplinary sanctions in an effort to maintain order and 
discipline, fines rarely are discussed. See, e.g., United States 
v. Newbv, 11 F.3d 1143 (3rd Cir. 1993). Instead, loss of good 
time and loss of privileges are often used as disciplinary 
measures. See, e.g., Id. at 1144. 
While prison officials are given deference on prison 
11 
matters which affect safety, security and discipline (see Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 
(1979)), the fine in this case was not directly related to prison 
safety or discipline. Instead, it was a distinct punishment 
which should be viewed as punitive and outside the areas of 
prison deference. Unlike other prison disciplinary measures, a 
fine alters and adds to the sentence an individual is serving. 
It therefore is distinct from removal of good time credit or 
other similar disciplinary measures. The effect of such a fine 
is punitive in nature, thereby triggering the Double Jeopardy 
Clause. Mendoza's right to be free from double jeopardy was 
violated in this case where he was initially punished pursuant to 
prison disciplinary procedures and the criminal charges 
subsequently were filed in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Mendoza respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court's denial of his Motion to Dismiss and 
remand this case to the trial court for dismissal. 
SUBMITTED this ^6t day of November, 1996. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JANET MILLER 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be 
delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102; two copies to Blake Nakamura, Deputy District Attorney, 
2001 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84190; and one copy 
to Frank D. Mylar, Assistant Attorney General, Heber M. Wells 
Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P. 0. Box 140854, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this #&, day of November, 1996. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED this day of November, 1996. 
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ADDENDUM A 
FILED 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS^T/lfAtO^^ V$ W$ / 
ooooo COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Edgardo Mendoza, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
ORDER 
Case No. 950337-CA 
ftffOOOSgtf y7f3 
This matter is before the court on a petition for permission 
to appeal from an interlocutory order. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is granted. All 
proceedings subsequent shall be as, and within the time required, 
for appeals from final judgments. Utah R. App. P. 5(e). 
Dated this^j^7 day of June, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
James Z. Davis, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of June, 1995, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand-delivered to a 
personal representative of the Legal Defender's Office to be 
delivered to the parties listed below: 
Janet Miller 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
Attorneys at Law 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited 
in the United States mail to the parties listed below: 
Salt Lake District Attorney 
2001 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190-1200 
The Honorable Roger A. Livingston Third Circuit, Sandy 
Third Circuit Court Department #941000329 MS 
210 West 10000 South 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Dated this 22nd day of June, 1995. 
By tm.<& < LL(\( 
Deputy Clerk 
ADDENDUM B 
UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant. 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) Tb appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) lb receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) Tb testify in his own behalf; 
(d) lb be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) lb have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in 
his behalf; 
(f) lb a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district 
where the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) lb the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) lb be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be 
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail 
and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a 
husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a 
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by 
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a 
magistrate. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger, nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
ADDENDUM C 
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JANET MILLER 6410 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 E. 500 S. Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTTJATE OF UTAH, SANDY DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
• J 
EDGARDO MENDOZA ] 
Defendant 
Notion To Dismiss 
) Case No. 941000329 MS 
Judge Livingston 
Comes now the Defendant, EDGARDO MENDOZA, by and through counsel of record, JANET MILLER, and moves this Court to 
dismiss the charges on the grounds that the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy precludes criminal prosecution and 
punishment where defendant has previousiy been punished folbwing a disciplinary hearing for the same offense, see Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments; State v. Miller. 747 P i d 440 (Utah Ct App. 1987); United States v. Halper. 490 U i . 435,104 L i d i d . 487 (1989). 
Defendant respectfully submits the following memorandum of law in support of his motion to dismiss. 
JANET MILLER 6410 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 E. 500 S. Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, SANDY DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Motion To Dismiss 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) 
EDGARDO MENDOZA, ) Case No. 941000329 MS 
Judge Livingston 
Defendant ) 
FAQS 
Defendant has been charged by Information with Assault on a Correctional Officer, a Class A Misdemeanor, at the Utah 
State Prison, occurring on or about August 7,1994. Prior to the filing of the criminal charge, a disciplinary hearing on the matter was 
held at the Utah State Prison. Case No. 394-08091.' After finding Defendant guilty of Assault with Body Fluid at the disciplinary 
hearing, the Utah Department of Corrections sentenced Defendant to a $ 200.00 fine and 30 days punitive isolation. 
1
 Defendant has twice subpoenaed but has not received records from the disciplinary hearing, see Addendum A. Further facts 
contained in this memorandum regarding the disciplinary hearing were obtained solely from Defendant 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROHIBITS THE STATE FROH PROSECUTING DEFENDANT 
TWICE FOR THE SAME OFFENSE. 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of both the United States and the Utah Constitutions protects against three separate abuses by 
prohibiting: ( I ) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after convictions; 
and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Miller. 747 P i d 440,444 (Utah CL App. 1987); United States v. Halper. 490 
\iS. 435,440104 LEdJd 487,496 (1989). "Whatever other abuses the Clause prohibits, at its most fundamental level it protects and 
accused against repeated attempts to exact one or more punishments for the same offense." United States v. $405.08923 U i . Currency, 
e taL ,33 F i d 1210,1215 (1994). 
Civil sanctions which are punitive in nature constitute "punishment" for the purpose of analyzing the Double Jeopardy Clause's 
prohibition against multiple punishments. Halper. 490 U i . at 447-48. The constitutional protection against multiple punishment is 
"intrinsically personal." Id. at 447. Its violation can be identified only be assessing the character of the actual sanctions imposed on the 
individual by the machinery of the state." Id. Labeling a proceeding "civil" or "administrative" does not suffice for the purposes of Double 
Jeopardy analysis. Id. at 448. "[I]n determining whether a particular civil sanction constitutes criminal punishment, it is the purposes 
actually served by the sanction in question, not the underlying nature of the proceeding giving rise to the sanction, that must be 
evaluated." Jd. at 447, n. 7. Simply put, a civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the 
individual case serves the goals of punishment Jd. at 448. 
The traditional goals of punishment are retribution and deterrence. Id. "Furthermore, 'retribution and deterrence are not 
legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives.'" Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish. 441 U i . 520,539 n. 20; 60 LEdJd 447 (1979) (federal 
jail's search policies, double-bunking and restrictions on packages and books not "punishment" in violation of pretrial detainee's 
constitutional rights). 
In Halper. the federal government prosecuted Halper for filing false Medicare claims. He was convicted and sentenced in a 
criminal proceeding. Subsequently, the federal government sued Halper under the False Claim Act demanding over $130,000.00 in civil 
sanctions when its actual loss amounted to $585.00. jd . at 437-38. Because the civil sanction was so disproportionate to the 
government's actual loss, it could not fairly be characterized as remedial. The Court held that the civil sanction constituted "punishment" 
in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause's guarantee against imposing multiple punishments. 
A. Sanctions imposed upon Defendant following the disciplinary hearing constitute punishment under the double jeopardy clause 
and preclude subsequent criminal prosecution for the same underlying offense. 
Dismissal is proper in the case at bar. The disciplinary hearing and the pending criminal charges constitute two separate 
proceedings. The pursuit of the criminal prosecution of this case, forces Defendant to marshal a defense against precisely the same 
conduct adjudicated in the prison disciplinary action. There can be Tittle doubt that this is just the type of action the Double Jeopardy 
Clause seeks to protect 
Dismissal is proper also on the grounds that the sanctions imposed on Defendant following the disciplinary hearing constitute 
"punishment". The imposition of the $200.00 fine and 30 day punitive isolation following the disciplinary hearing only serves the goals 
of retribution and deterrence triggering Fifth Amendment protection; neither sanctions is solely remedial. 
A fine is by definition punishment Webster's defines a fine as "a sum of money paid by way of penalty for an offense; a 
pecuniary punishment To fine, is to subject to a pecuniary penalty for an offense or breach of law; to punish by fine.7 Historically, fines 
were imposed as a form of retribution. 
In Sims v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 841 P2d 6,11-13 (Utah 1992), the court held that civil proceedings under the Illegal Drug 
Stamp Tax Act were quasi-criminal in nature because by imposing a substantial tax the statute sought to punish and deter those aught 
with drugs. 
Money taken from the books of prisoners goes to the prison's general fund. It is not used to directly compensate the victim for 
his or her losses. The amount imposed does not reflect an assessment of any monetary losses suffered by the prison or victim. Indeed, the 
amount imposed appears to reflect the prison board's assessment of the seriousness of the prisoner's conduct 
2
 Webster's Dictionary, 2nd Ed. Unabridged pg. 687. 
Haloed progeny shed light on this issue. 
In Austin v. United States, 113 S.Q. 2801,12S LEd id 488 (1993), the Supreme Court relied on the holding in Halper stating 
that a civil sanction a n count as punishment for Double Jeopardy purposes. (Civil drug forfeiture counts as "punishment" for purposes of 
Excessive Fines Clause). In United States v. $405,08923 U i . Currency, 33 F3d 1210.1216 (1994), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, in turn, relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Austin and held that a civil forfeiture action based on the same offense as a 
criminal charge could violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
In $40508923, the federal government sought forfeiture of property pursuant to federal statutes governing forfeiture of 
proceeds of illegal narcotks transactions and of money involved in money laundering transactions of three defendants subsequent to their 
convictions on drug conspiracy and money laundering charges. The Court found the Fifth Amendment violated, reasoning that the civil 
forfeiture action and the defendant's criminal prosecution constituted separate proceedings. The Court reasoned further that the 
forfeiture statutes do not serve a purely remedial purpose but rather serve retributive or deterrent purposes and thus constitute 
"punishment", triggering Fifth Amendment protections. 33 F id at 1218. 
This issue was most recently addressed by the U i . District Court for the District of Oregon in United Stated v. Stanwood. DC 
Ore, Civil No. 94-1333-JO, (12/16/94). In Stanwood. the government commenced civil forfeiture proceedings against real estate upon 
which the defendant had been growing marijuana soon after the defendant's indictment for that offense. The defendant entered into a 
settlement agreement on the forfeiture claim. Before final judgment was entered in the forfeiture case, the defendant pleaded guilty in 
the criminal case. 
The defendant fs double jeopardy challenge came in the form of a collateral attack, forcing the Court to decide whether 
$40508923 announced a new constitutional rule which could not be applied retroactively. Relying on the Halper and Austin decisions, 
the Court concluded that $405089.23 could be applied to this defendant's case. The Court in Stanwood held that the civil forfeiture case 
and the criminal case constituted separate proceedings and that the civil forfeiture case constituted punishment for the purposes of 
double jeopardy analysis. However the Court found also that jeopardy attached in Stanwood's criminal case when he entered his guilty 
plea on November 25,1991; jeopardy attached in the forfeiture case when final judgments were entered in March, 1992. Based on the 
dates jeopardy attached, the Court found that Stanwood's criminal conviction was the first punishment and therefore did not violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause. 
The double jeopardy analysis in Halper was applied to prison disciplinary hearings in People v. Watson, No. 93CA0565,1994 
W l 419957 (Colo. Ct App. Aug. I I , 1994). The court in Watson noted that the purpose of prison disciplinary hearings was to maintain 
institutional order, jd j r t 2. The court then determined whether the sanctions imposed on Watson were remedial in nature or whether 
the constituted "punishment" as defined in Halper. The specific sanctions imposed on Watson were loss of good time credit, transfer, and 
segregation. Because the goal of the sanctions was to promote inmate rehabilitation and maintain order, the court held that they did not 
constitute punishment triggering double jeopardy analysis. 
The Watson court did not address the issue at ban whether imposing a fine and punitory isolation in a prison disciplinary 
action constitutes punishment as defined in Halper. This issue has not been directly raised in Utah. InlohnsvShulsen, 717 P2d 1336, 
1338 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court held that parole revocation hearings are administrative proceedings and are therefore civil in 
nature. In State v. Mercies, 601 P2d 925,926 (1979), the court held that a defendant who was criminally prosecuted for escape was not 
twice put in jeopardy because he was disciplined by the prison board. Menzies is not controlling here. Menzies was decided a decade 
before the United States Supreme Court's holding in Halper. the Menzies court did not specifically address the narrow question raised in 
Halper and here. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully moves this Court to dismiss the charges. Defendant's subjection to punishment following the August 24, 
1994 prison disciplinary hearing trigger the protection o Fifth Amendment, applicable to the State of Utah through the Fourteenth 
Amendment ^ 
DATED this ^\ day of February, 1995. 
miVmUiA 
T MILLER 
rney for Defendant 
HAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the Salt Lake'District Attorney, 2001 Sooth State Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84190-1200 this f A day of February, 1995. 
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ADDENDUM D 
JANET MILLER 6410 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
424 EAST 500 SOUTH SUITE 3 00 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
(801) 532-5444 
FILED 
MAY 2 51995 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
EDGARDO MENDOZA, 
Defendant/Petitioner 
PETITION FOR PERMISSION 
TO APPEAL INTERLOCUTORY 
ORDER 
95-0337-CA 
Trial Court No. 941000329MS 
Edgardo Mendoza, through counsel, Janet Miller, petitions 
the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, to permit an appeal from the interlocutory order of 
the Honorable Judge Livingston entered in this manner of May 8, 
1995. A copy of the order sought to be reviewed is attached. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Edgardo Mendoza has been charged by Information with Assault 
on a Correctional Officer, a Class A Misdemeanor, at the Utah 
State Prison, occurring on or about August 7, 1994. Prior to the 
filing of the criminal charge, a disciplinary hearing on the 
matter was held at the prison. After finding Defendant guilty of 
Assault with Body Fluid at the disciplinary hearing, the Utah 
Department of Corrections sentenced Mr. Mendoza to a $200.00 fine 
and 3 0 days punitive isolation. 
QUESTION OF LAW 
At issue is whether the protection of Double Jeopardy Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution extend 
to a criminal prosecution of a defendant where the defendant has 
previously been sanctioned for the same offense after a prison 
disciplinary hearing. More specifically at issue is whether the 
$200.00 fine and 30 days punitive isolation assessed against Mr. 
Mendoza constitute punishment thereby prohibiting the State from 
prosecuting Mendoza in the Circuit Court and subjecting him to 
multiple punishments for the same offense. 
"The most basic element of the Double Jeopardy Clause is the 
protection it affords against successive prosecutions -- that is, 
against efforts to impose punishment for the same offense in two 
or more separate proceedings." United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. 
Currency. 33 F.2d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 1994). 
In United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892 
(1989), the Supreme Court held that where a civil sanction or 
fine is not rationally related to a remedial goal of compensating 
the government, such a fine is considered "punitive" and hence 
subject to the Double Jeopardy prohibition of multiple punishment 
in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
According to Halper, civil sanctions which are punitive in nature 
constitute "punishment" for the purpose of analyzing the Double 
Jeopardy Clause's prohibition against multiple punishments. 490 
U.S. at 447-48. Rejecting the government's argument that 
"punishment" for double jeopardy purposes occurs only in criminal 
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and not in civil proceedings, the Court stated, lf[I]n determining 
whether a particular civil sanction constitutes criminal 
punishment, it is the purposes actually served by the sanction in 
question, not the underlying nature of the proceeding giving rise 
to the sanction, that must be evaluated." Id. at 448. 
Thus according to Halper a civil sanction that is not 
exclusively remedial, but can also be explained as effecting 
retribution or deterrence is punishment for double jeopardy 
purposes. See id. Accord United States v. Hudson, 14 F.3d 536, 
540 (10th Cir. 1994) ("if sanction is not exclusively remedial, 
but rather can be explained as affecting deterrence or 
retribution, it is punishment for double jeopardy analysis."). 
The Supreme Court relied on its holding in Halper in Austin 
v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed 2d 499 (1993) stating 
that a civil sanction can count as punishment for Double Jeopardy 
purposes. (Civil drug forfeiture counts as "punishment" for 
purposes of Excessive Fines Clause) . 
Following Halper and Austin, the Court, in Department of 
Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct 1937 (1994) , again 
held that imposition of drug tax penalty after a criminal 
sanction had been imposed on the Kurths constituted a violation 
of the Double Jeopardy Clause and the rule of Halper. In Kurth 
Ranch, the Kurths pleaded guilty to unlawful cultivation of 
marijuana and received individual sentences. While attempting to 
discharge their debt in a bankruptcy proceeding, the Montana 
taxing authorities, which had imposed the drug tax on the Kurths, 
3 
filed a claim with the bankruptcy court. The Kurths challenged 
this claim on the ground that the drug tax was not a valid 
assessment, having been imposed in violation of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. the bankruptcy judge as well as the district 
court and the appellate court agreed with the Kurths. See id. at 
1938. 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court agreed with the courts 
below that the drug tax was is essence a second punishment: 
This drug tax is not the kink of remedial sanction that may follow 
the first punishment of a criminal offense. Instead, it is a 
second punishment within the contemplation of a constitutional 
protection that has 'deep roots in our history and jurisprudence,' 
Halper, 490 U.S. at 44 0, and there fore must be imposed during the 
first prosecution or not at all. The proceeding Montana initiated 
to collect a tax on the possession of drugs was the functional 
equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution that placed the 
Kurths in jeopardy a second time 'for the same offense.' 
Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct. at 1948. 
Believing itself bound by United States Supreme Court 
precedents, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit in United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency* 33 F.3d 
1210, 1216 (1994), held that a civil forfeiture action based on 
the same offense as a criminal charge could violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. 
In $405,089.23, the federal government sought forfeiture of 
property pursuant to federal statutes governing forfeiture of 
proceeds of illegal narcotics transactions and of money involved 
in money laundering charges. The Court found the Fifth Amendment 
violated, reasoning that the civil forfeiture action and the 
Defendant's criminal prosecution constituted separate 
4 
proceedings. The Court reasoned further that the forfeiture 
statutes do not serve a purely remedial purpose, but rather serve 
retributive or deterrent purposes and thus constitute 
"punishment", triggering Fifth Amendment protection. 33 F.3d at 
1218. 
Mendoza challenges both the Findings of Fact (specifically 
Numbers 4. - 7. , and 9.) and Conclusions of Law contained in the 
Interlocutory Order. The $200.00 fine and 30 days punitive 
isolation imposed upon Mendoza following the prison disciplinary 
hearing constitute "punishment" under the analysis demanded by 
Halper and its progeny. Further, the specific issue at bar is 
one of first impression. 
While other courts have considered whether the Double 
Jeopardy Clause prohibits criminal prosecution for an offense 
following prison administrative discipline, none have addressed 
the very narrow issue at bar of whether the fine and punitive 
isolation constitute "punishment", and many were decided after 
Halper and its progeny. See Garrity v. Fiedler, 41 F.3d 1150 (7th 
Cir. 1994), Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979), United States 
v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143 (3d Cir. 1993), United States v. Rising, 
867 F.2d 1255 (10th Cir. 1989), United States v. Apker, 419 F.2d 
388 (9th Cir. 1969), United States v. Stuckev, 441 F.2d 1104 (3d 
Cir.) cert denied 404 U.S. 841 (1971). 
In Garrity, the court found that administrative prison 
discipline of segregation and extension of the defendant's 
release date from prison does not preclude subsequent criminal 
5 
prosecution. 41 F.3d at 1152. Bell v. Wolfish upheld the 
prison's search policies, double-bunking, and restrictions on 
packages as permissible nonpunitive objectives. 99 S.Ct. at 1886. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Newby found that 
the sanctions of transfer, segregation, and loss of good time 
credit survive Double Jeopardy scrutiny. 11 F.3d at 1146. The 
Rising Court found that "administrative punishment" assessed 
against the defendant for the murder of another inmate did not 
bar subsequent criminal prosecution for the same offense; that 
Court, however, did not state specifically of what the 
"administrative punishment" consisted. In 1969, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Apker found that segregation 
from other prisoners following an administrative hearing did not 
bar criminal prosecution. 419 F.2d 388. The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit found similarly in Stuckev finding 
that 15 days segregation and subsequent criminal prosecution did 
not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
ISSUE RAISED IN TRIAL COURT 
On February 21, 1995, Mr. Mendoza filed with the Circuit 
Court, Sandy Department, a Motion to Dismiss based on Double 
Jeopardy to the Defendant. The Salt Lake District Attorney filed 
a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on March 6, 1995. The Utah Attorney 
General's Office also filed a Memorandum regarding Double 
Jeopardy on March 10, 1995, on behalf of the Utah Department of 
Corrections. Counsel from all sides argued the Motion on March 
6 
13, 1995. The State was represented by District Attorney Neal 
Gunnarson, Deputy District Attorney Blake Nakamura and Assistant 
Attorney General Frank Mylar. The Honorable Judge Livingston 
took the matter under advisement, denying Mendoza's Motion to 
Dismiss on March 20, 1995. Judge Livingston signed the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss on May 8, 1995. 
IMMEDIATE APPEAL NECESSARY 
Mr. Mendoza's substantial rights are at stake. By pursuing 
criminal prosecution, the State is forcing Mendoza to marshall a 
defense in the Third Circuit Court against charges which have 
already been adjudicated in a separate proceeding behind prison 
walls and for which he has already been punished. 
Many inmates at the Utah State Prison, like Mendoza, are 
facing criminal prosecution for offenses which have been heard, 
resolved, and sentence imposed at a prison disciplinary hearing. 
Immediate appeal of this case would effectuate plea bargaining 
and case resolution of many other pending matters as well as 
those which have yet to have been filed. 
ADVANCE TERMINATION OF LITIGATION 
Should prosecution continue, Mendoza intends to invoke his 
constitutional right to a trial by jury. Immediate appeal of the 
issue at bar, if successful, would terminate this litigation and 
would save the taxpayers of the State of Utah a considerable 
dollar amount by eliminating the need for a trial by jury. 
Further, immediate appeal would quell safety concerns of the 
7 
State in transporting defense witnesses from the Utah State 
Prison to the Third Circuit Court in Sandy. Mendoza was housed 
with many death-row inmates in Uintah Two at the time of the 
alleged offense and intends to call several inmates as witnesses 
if trial becomes necessary. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this l]/\) day of May, 1995. 
/JANET MILLER " 
(Attorney for Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of 
the Salt Lake District Attorney, 2001 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 this day of May, 1995. 
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ADDENDUM E 
Frank D. Mylar (5116) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
330 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 575-1600 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, SANDY DIVISION 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
EDGARDO MENDOZA, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 941000329 MS 
Judge Livingston 
This matter comes before this court on Defendant's motion to 
dismiss on the grounds that he is being subjected to multiple 
punishments in violation of the double jeopardy clauses of the 
United States and Utah Constitutions. Specifically Defendant 
claims he was "punished" within the meaning of double jeopardy 
following an administrative disciplinary hearing at the Utah State 
Prison. The Defendant was represented by Janet Miller, the State 
was represented by District Attorney Neal Gunnarson# Deputy 
District Attorney Blake Nakamura, and Assistant Attorney General, 
Frank D. Mylar, representing the Utah Department of Corrections 
(UDC). 
After reviewing memoranda submitted by all parties, the 
affidavit of Terry Bartlett, Director of Institutional Operations 
for the UDC, and hearing oral argument of the parties, the court 
now enters the following findings of fact and conclusion of laws: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On about August 7, 1994, Defendant allegedly assaulted a 
Utah State Prison correctional officer with bodily fluids. 
2. After an administrative disciplinary hearing at the 
prison, Defendant was found in violation of prison rules and fined 
$200,00 and restricted to his cell for 30 days. 
3. As a separate and unrelated proceeding, Defendant is 
currently being prosecuted in this criminal court for Assault on a 
Correctional Officer, a Class A Misdemeanor, arising out of the 
same alleged assault of August 7, 1994. 
4. Prison officials discipline inmates to assist in 
rehabilitation and to maintain a safe, secure, and orderly managed 
institution. (See Affidavit of Terry Bartlett, 1 2) . 
5. The disciplinary process at the Utah State Prison is 
essential to assist prison officials in managing the behavior of 
convicted felons by determining whether prison rules are broken. 
If rules are broken, the prison uses this information to assess the 
inmatefs security classification and rehabilitative needs. 
(Affidavit of Bartlett, 1 3). 
6. Fines that are assessed following a disciplinary 
conviction are no more than $200.00 and go towards reimbursing the 
prison the costs of the hearing, including investigation costs when 
2 
applicable. Additional monetary amounts may be charged to the 
inmate to reimburse the prison for property damage or related 
costs. (Affidavit of Bartlett, 1 4). 
7. Monetary judgments and fines, as well as punitive 
isolation (i.e. restrictions from privileges through confinement in 
one's cell), also serve to encourage proper inmate behavior and 
rehabilitate the inmate. (Affidavit of Bartlett, 1 5). 
8. The disciplinary hearing process at the Utah State Prison 
is a civil administrative process and not criminal in nature. 
9. The administrative discipline received by Defendant of 30 
days of restriction to his cell and a fine of $200.00 was not 
"grossly disproportionate to the prison's remedial goals." 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the above findings of fact, the court now enters 
the following conclusions of law: 
1. The administrative discipline received by Defendant of 30 
days of restriction to his cell and a fine of $200.00 was not 
"punishment" within the meaning of the double jeopardy clause of the 
United States or Utah constitutions. 
2. The Defendant is not being subjected to "multiple 
punishments." 
3. The Defendant is not being subjected to double jeopardy. 
3 
ORDER 
Based upon the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
the court now makes the following ORDER: 
Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied. 
DATED this i day of 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on April 19, 1995, I caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, an exact copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss to: 
Janet Miller 
Elizabeth Bowman 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Blake Nakamura 
Deputy District Attorney 
E. Neal Gunnarson 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
2001 South State Street, S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1210 
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